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0. Introducción * 
 
This paper looks at the process of international financial and monetary reform from the 
moment of the crisis in Asia until the start of 2010 in terms of the basic objectives which 
international financial architecture should meet. Those objectives are essentially the 
following: (i) to regulate the financial and capital markets  in all countries, as well as cross-
border transactions, in order to avoid the excessive risk accumulation which has caused 
frequent, costly crises, both in developing as well as in developed countries; (ii) to offer 
emergency financing during crises, especially to ensure liquidity, complementing the 
functions of the central banks which act as lenders of last resort at a national level; (iii) to 
provide adequate mechanisms at an international level to manage problems of excessive 
leverage; to guarantee the consistency of national economic policies with the stability of the 
world economy system, and to avoid the macroeconomic policies of some countries having 
adverse effects on others; and (v) to guarantee an international monetary system which 
contributes to the stability of the international economy and is seen as fair by all parties. The 
Monterrey Consensus, approved by the United Nations International Conference on Financing 
for Development, which took place in 2002, might come closest to the definition of those 
goals although it does not include any of them explicitly (especially not the last one).  
While some of those objectives refer to crisis prevention, others relate to the handling of 
crises once they have started. Nevertheless, such a division is not a straightforward one since 
some good instruments for handling crises also have preventive effects as the history of the 
central banks throughout the world shows. Nor is the distinction between micro and 
macroeconomic matters clear-cut since, as we shall see, financial regulation should include an 
important element of macroeconomic protection. 
This paper is divided into four parts. Given the importance of the debate under way on 
financial regulation as a central mechanism to prevent crisis, the first section tackles this 
theme as well as corresponding questions on institutional arrangements. The last section of 
that part analyses a question which is partially interrelated to the previous ones which has 
emerged strongly in recent debates: the role of an international tax on some financial 
transactions. The second part considers some of the main problems concerned with the 
prevention and tackling of crisis in the developing world. That part concentrates, therefore, on 
the second and third objectives and the way in which developing countries have responded to 
the flaws in international financial architecture; this section will also look at a closely related 
question of the increasing demand by developing countries to participate in international 
financial organisations. The third part analyses the fourth and fifth objectives mentioned 
which, as we will see, are related. After briefly considering some of the problems associated 
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with how to guarantee the consistency of national macroeconomic policies, we look more 
closely at reform of the international monetary system and propose a reform based on a 
significant expansion by the IMF (International Monetary Fund) of the use of Special 
Drawing Rights (SDRs). To conclude, the last part presents an overview of the reform of the 
international financial system since the Asian crisis; here we also study some of the 
characteristics of global economic governance. 
It is worth highlighting that the paper focuses on monetary and financial architecture and 
leaves aside, therefore, recent events on matters of financing for development, which also 
show a clearly complicated panorama, but where some positive developments stand out: the 
clear recovery of the official development aid after the Monterrey Conference and the 
aggressive response of multilateral development banks to provide financing during the recent 
crisis. It is nevertheless possible that the global crisis has constrained  the first of those 









The seriousness of the global financial crisis laid bare the magnitude of the regulatory deficit 
that existed. This problem was particularly acute in developed countries since many 
developing countries had responded to the series of financial crises they faced from the 1980s 
by strengthening their regulatory and supervisory frameworks. This regulatory deficit has two 
different dimensions. One the one hand, although the banking system was  regulated, the 
regulation was insufficient in key areas and enforcement was not adequate due to deficiencies 
in the supervisory systems. On the other hand, there were significant areas of financial 
activity and financial agents (the so-called “shadow banking system”) that lacked any form of 
regulation. 
The main effort made at an international level before the crisis was the negotiation of the 
Basel Agreement on banking regulation (Basel II). Although this agreement has various 
positive elements, it also contained a series of important flaws. One of its most worrying 
features, highlighted by a few commentators in the early 21st century (Griffith-Jones, 
Segoviano and Spratt 2002; Goodhart 2002), and clearly recognised after the global crisis was 
the fact that it reinforces the naturally cyclical behaviour of bank loans. In fact, the main 
failure of the financial markets is the tendency, both of lenders and borrowers, to assume 
excessive risks during boom periods. Those risks lead to significant losses later, when growth 
slows, in bank portfolios and other losses, and that can set off financial crises. Basel II 
exacerbated this pro-cyclical behaviour by giving increasing weight to the risk evaluation 
models of the banks themselves in the determination of suitable capital levels, which 
reproduces the inherent pro-cyclical pattern in the behaviour of banks.  
The need to introduce specific anti-cyclical mechanisms in banking regulation had been 
recognised by some analysts since the end of the 1990s, especially by the United Nations and 
the Bank for International Settlements (Ocampo, 2003; Griffith-Jones and Ocampo, 2009). In 
this field, one of the most important innovations was the Spanish system of anticyclical 
banking provisions, initially introduced in 2000. However, neither those analyses nor the 
Spanish practice received adequate attention and were ignored by Basel II. 
Another problem of Basel II was that it overestimated the risk of bank loans made to 
developing countries, overlooking the fact the benefits of diversifying the international 
portfolio in terms of risk reduction. As a result of this flaw, Basel II can result in excessive 
capital requirements for loans to developing countries, reducing those loans and/or increasing 
their costs. It would be an extremely good idea if Basel II incorporated a factor into it which 
took account of the benefits of diversification as it did for loans to small and medium-sized 




The areas which lack regulation include, firstly, off-balance sheet bank transactions, which 
have in fact been one of the most important sources by which the global crisis in the mortgage 
bond markets and other wrongly highly rated assets spread to the banks. In the same way, 
problem loans at some banks spread to other agents in the financial markets. The problems 
inherent in rating assets by rating agencies have also been the subject of a lot of attention in 
recent debates, above all the tendency to poorly evaluate the risk of loans which are not going 
to be kept on a bank’s own books but which are to be sold off. Those loans heavily 
contributed to the crisis. 
Another area with poor regulation is the derivatives market and the alternative investment 
funds (generally called hedge funds in the Anglo Saxon world, although their operations go 
beyond hedging operations), which are particularly active in derivatives markets. Given the 
multiple flaws which characterise those markets (which fall far short and are very imperfect, 
particularly during crises), it is crucial to improve regulation here.1 Lastly, the lack of 
regulation of the ratings agencies has also been the subject of a great deal of debate, as well as 
the possible conflicts of interest between their rating business and their business advising 
agents which are active in the market (Goodhart, 2010). 
One of the most important breakthroughs in the international debate of the last two years has 
been the recognition that the international financial crisis was clearly associated with 
inadequate, insufficient supervision of financial activities. This is precisely the sphere in 
which the G-20 has played a role, especially in reaching agreement on certain principles, the 
implementation of which, nevertheless, remains the subject of debate and on which slow 
progress is being made in the United States and Europe, as well as in international regulatory 
organisations. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (which we will refer to from 
now on as the Basel Committee) had already started to discuss among its members some 
practices as a complement to the regulations that Basel II introduced (Basel Committee 2009a 
and 2009b).  
The Basel Committee’s proposals, which will be refined in July 2010 and approved in 
November 2010, put forward significant increases in capital requirements, especially for Tier 
1, as well as a stricter definition of that capital, both designed to strengthen the solvency of 
banks. The proposals would also imply increasing capital for bank operations in the capital 
markets (the “trading book”) and the introduction of anticyclical provisions, an issue that we 
will address in greater detail later. Finally, the proposals make liquidity requirements stricter 
and more explicit and they propose a new maximum leverage limit to restrict banks’ total 
assets as a proportion of their Tier 1 capital. At the time of writing this paper, it is still not 
totally clear either the scale of the measures, or the speed with which they will be approved, 
since there are some differences of opinion between the member countries of the Basel 
Committee as well as serious lobbying from the banks to limit the increases in capital 
requirements; that said, the head of the Basel Committee has stated the clear commitment of 
the Committee to adopt significant reforms to strengthen banks. 
These national and international proposals have followed two basic principles that are worth 
analysing in detail: those that guarantee a comprehensive, as well as a countercyclical 
                                                 




regulation. But they have also tackled other matters, among them consumer protection and the 
need to down size excessively large financial institutions. 
The first principle mentioned is that regulation should be comprehensive, or that it should at 
least have a broad scope in terms of instruments, institutions and markets (D’Arista and 
Griffith-Jones, 2010), in order to avoid, as we highlighted, serious avoidance of regulation 
through non-banking intermediaries (or barely regulated banking intermediaries), which 
contributed to the crisis. Moreover, that should be accompanied by an increase in the capital 
base, that should also be better quality, consistent, transparent and cover all the risks which 
financial institutions face (including those associated with securitisation, investment in shares, 
bonds and other securities which form part of the “trading book”, and the counterparty risk 
associated with derivative operations and the financing of operations in the capital market), as 
recognised in the Basel Committee proposals mentioned. For many analysts an essential 
element is the obligation for all markets to be open and transparent and, therefore, to limit 
over the counter trades. The initiative of some US legislators (which has still to be approved) 
to oblige all standard derivatives to pass through clearing houses would be a positive step to 
improve transparency and reduce counterparty risk and it should be applied to all derivative 
transactions. We can expect European regulation to follow these US reforms on transparency 
in the derivatives markets. In the case of alternative investment funds, especially for hedge 
funds, it is the European Union that has taken initiatives to improve transparency by requiring 
their registration, as well as proposing some precautionary regulatory measures; however, 
those proposals have now been approved in spite of opposition from financial players and the 
reservations of some countries.  
It has also been recognised that financial intermediaries that are systemically important should 
be subject to particularly rigorous supervision, and even to stricter regulatory norms, and that 
the methods of compensation of executives in the financial sector should be subject to 
regulation. The first question has been particularly focused on in the Unitedd States where the 
Treasury Department announced in 2009 that capital requirements of large financial 
intermediaries would be proportionally higher. In 2010, President Obama went further and 
announced limits on the size of banks. Since 1994, there are limits on the ratio of total 
deposits (10%) that can be held by one bank; the new rule would also apply to other 
liabilities. Another important proposal announced by President Obama would ban the use of 
bank resources in their own trading (so-called “proprietary trading”). That rule would also 
affect a group of large financial institutions, which trade on a large scale using their own 
resources and those of depositors. 
The Financial Stability Board has welcomed this initiative but has highlighted that this is just 
one of various options designed to tackle the issue of organisations being too large to be 
allowed to go bankrupt (“too big to fail”). Those options include, for instance, capital, 
leverage and liquidity requirements being based on size and the complexity of the structures 
of financial conglomerates. 
The question of regulating the bonuses of executives and traders at financial companies has 
similarly ignited heated national and international debate. The key problem has been not only 
that the salaries are excessive but also that they are structured in such a way that they 
incentivise highly profitable short-term activities which are excessively risky in the medium-




financial system as a whole. Those bonuses are also asymetric since they are high when short-
term profits are high but never negative (and even continue to be high) when there are large 
losses. The Financial Stability Board has stated its intention to raise the capital requirements 
of institutions that have bonus systems that increase future risk. Several countries have taken 
partial measures in this respect although they are insufficient. 
The second principle which we have highlighted, and which represents an important step 
forward in recent discussions, has been the recognition that safeguards should have a clear 
countercyclical focus. The crisis generated, in fact, a large consensus on the need to adopt 
counter cyclical regulations both at the G-20 level (2009a and 2009b) as well as in diverse 
international reports on regulatory matters (the Untied Nations, 2009 and the Warwick 
Commission, 2009, for instance). As a result of this, the Basel Committee included some 
suggestions in this area in its December 2009 proposals (Basel Commission, 2009b). There is, 
moreover, a growing consensus that it is not sufficient to reduce the procyclical nature of 
existing regulation (Basel II); it is also essential to curb the natural tendency of banks and 
financial markets to generate huge booms, which result unsustainable in the end and which 
therefore result in heavy falls and even collapsing markets. 
The most important rules would be those to oblige financial institutions to accumulate more 
capital (or non-distributable reserves) and/or provisions for debts that are unlikely to be 
collected,  or provisions to be set aside in boom periods to increase the capacity of financial 
institutions to act during crises. One alternative, the one introduced by the Spanish system, 
would be to make the provisions when the loans are made, based on the expected losses 
(“potential losses”), estimated on the basis of a complete economic cycle. The advantage of 
this system is that it allows provisions to be accumulated against losses during the phases of 
rapid expansion of credit, giving a “rainy day provision” to absorb losses during crises which 
can also contribute to putting a curb on the credit boom – although that did not happen in the 
Spanish case (Saurina, 2009). There is, moreover, some agreement on the need to set absolute 
limits on leverage (the relationship between the value of total assets and the capital of 
institutions). Some analysts have even proposed direct restrictions on credit growth during 
boom times. Accounting rules, as well as capital and provision requirements, should also take 
into account the nature of the financing which financial institutions use (short-term versus 
long-term, as the Warwick Commission highlights, 2009.) 
Another equally important element to countercyclical regulation are rules to avoid the heavily 
procyclical behaviour of financial asset and real estate prices multiplying during the booms 
through an artificially high value being attached to the credit guarantees. The rules should 
therefore restrict the value of the guarantees accepted during the periods of inflation of asset, 
make additional provisions obligatory for credits guarantees for assets that have rapidly 
increased their value, or increase the capital requirements in those cases. Any system of this 
type would have avoided or softened the highly costly crisis in low quality mortgages in the 
United States, and also in European countries like Spain, Great Britain and Ireland. 
In the case of developing countries, the problems of currency mismatches are also very 
important, especially due to the tendency of exchange rates to appreciate during booms and to 
depreciate during crises. In the absence of appropriate anticyclical norms – or better still of 
restrictions or bans on those exposures – the risks assumed during the booms tend to be 




crises – and as various countries in central and eastern Europe learnt during the most recent 
one. 
Among the debates that co-exist in this field, an important one is related to the decision 
whether to opt for rules or to issue norms in a discretional way during periods of economic 
growth. There seems to be a global preference for pre-established rules, which would reduce 
the risk of regulatory interference, whether by financial interests or through excessive 
enthusiasm which characterises economic authorities during boom periods. Rules could be 
made stricter, but never looser during boom periods. Appropriate indicators (such as credit 
growth and/or asset prices) need to be chosen in order to ensure that the countercyclical 
capital set aside corresponds effectively to the cycle. 
One matter which has received relatively less attention in the field of anticyclical regulations 
is that of  liquidity, leaving aside the Basel Committee proposals on the banks, which we have 
already mentioned, which are in any case limited. Since solvency and liquidity are 
complementary, there might be arguments to have joint requirements on them, which would 
involve requiring institutions with large imbalances in maturity periods to hold more capital. 
However, since the capital would never be sufficient to cope with serious liquidity problems, 
there is a clear justification for setting specific requirements on liquidity based on, for 
instance, the residual maturity of the obligations of financial institutions. 
Accounting rules have also been a subject of much debate. They should satisfy both the need 
for transparency as well as for financial stability. One interesting alternative which has been 
suggested is for two accounting states to be estimated: one in which current earnings and 
losses are reported, according to valuations or market prices, and another in which future 
provisions are deducted from current earnings or for a non-distributable “economic cycle 
fund” to be established, which could only be used to cover losses in the future. 
In order to avoid regulatory arbitrage, it is important for anticyclical regulation to be applied 
to all institutions, instruments and markets, and both nationally as well as internationally. 
However, since economic cycles do not completely coincide, the regulations should be 
applied by the host countries, although in accordance with internationally agreed principles. 
One area in which coordination is essential has to do with contagion. A crisis in an important 
country (especially if it is an important creditor, debtor or trade partner) can seriously affect 
the financial stability or the economy of other countries even if those countries did not 
accumulate any systemic risk. Therefore, in a globalised economy all countries have a 
legitimate interest in avoiding procyclical excess in other countries. 
Two matters connected to the comprehensive and anticyclical nature of the regulations are 
related to the best moment to introduce the new norms and to the effect on access to credit. In 
terms of when, it is clear that it is important to agree regulation during crises when the 
political appetite for regulatory reforms is high and new rules also help to restore the 
confidence of the financial system. Increasing the scope of regulation should also be 
immediately applied. However, those rules involving more capital, provisions and liquidity 
should be gradually introduced and only fully implemented after the economy recovers and 




It should be noted that the banks have started to resist an increase in capital requirements as 
well as its anticyclical nature with the argument that they would reduce the total level of 
credit and ultimately economic growth. This argument reinforces the importance of gradually 
introducing the regulations but is not an argument for not pursuing regulatory reform. The 
fundamental argument for reform is that higher regulatory and anticyclical requirements 
would help to create a much more stable banking system, which would have a positive impact 
on long-term growth.  
In terms of access to credit, it is worth highlighting that stronger regulations should result in 
higher spreads, as well as excluding those agents from credit that are considered particularly 
risky. That could generate less financing for small and medium-sized companies or for poorer 
households. Therefore, it might be necessary to introduce additional instruments to guarantee 
access to credit. Higher margins could also mean companies with direct access to 
international credit markets could have an incentive to seek loans abroad, increasing the 
probability of currency exposure in the portfolios of those agents. This is why it is particularly 
important to introduce rules aimed at handling currency mismatches, as mentioned previously. 
Among the other issues worth highlighting in the process of strengthening regulation is the 
issue of consumer protection, which has been particularly important in the US debates. Due to 
the quality of toxic mortgages and high-risk investment vehicles, which were being offered in 
recent years to homes that were not financially sophisticated, consumer protection needs to be 
strengthened, as well as the principle that financial instruments should be as simple as 
possible since complexity leads to information problems and difficulties for the markets in 
valuing the corresponding instruments. 
It is also probable that the crisis under way ends by generating a larger market share for some 
companies in the financial industry. That means restrictions on monopolies and even the 
possibility of dividing up the largest institutions should also figure in the new regulations. 
That includes differential treatment to the largest institutions, mentioned earlier. Lastly, and 
very importantly, it is essential for safeguards to be applied with rigour and for supervision to 
be carried out to the highest standards. Some of the most serious errors that led to the current 
crisis were the result of a lack of supervisions and strict application of the current norms. 
  
2. THE GOVERNANCE OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL REGULATION. 
Despite their growing importance, due to the integration of financial markets, global 
regulatory Institutions have been – and continue to be perceived as – undemocratic and of 
limited effectiveness. One central problem here is the representation of developing countries, 
as the Monterrey Consensus has highlighted, as well as various academics and non-
governmental organisations across the world, and of course, the developing countries 
themselves. Nevertheless, while the Bank for International Settlements  has selectively 
increased its members,2 institutions like the Financial Stability Forum (FSF) and the Basel 
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Committee continued to exclude developing countries. An exception to this rule was the 
International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), the stock exchanges 
regulator, which had a wide representation from developing countries. However, its Technical 
Committee – which generates any regulatory initiatives – only had OECD countries as 
members.  
Given its importance and authority in establishing international banking standards, the Basel 
Committee has been the target of most criticism. The exclusion of developing countries from 
the Committee has doubtlessly distorted and biased the policies designed, which proved 
ineffective in guaranteeing financial stability and were biased against the interests of the 
developing world (Griffith-Jones and Persaud, 2008). However, despite all this criticism, it 
was not until the global crisis and the subsequent declaration by the G-20 in November 2008 
that some significant changes to the governance of the international regulatory institutions 
were made. 
As is obvious, representation of different members in the governance of an institution is 
translated into decision-making. That has been extremely well-discussed in the case of the 
IMF in which voting rights on the Managing Board influence significantlly in the decisions of 
that institution (Rustomjee, 2004; Woods and Lombardi, 2006). A similar effect is observed 
in regulatory organisations whose support of global financial stability proved less effective 
due to their very biased governance structures. 
If changes had been introduced to the country representations that make up the regulatory 
organisations, the very concentrated interests of the large private financial players could have 
been diluted. Many of the approaches, assumed and promoted by the large banks, such as use 
of risk models, reflected a confidence in the large banks being able to measure risk parameters 
themselves. Various developing countries were sceptical about the viability and effectiveness 
of those approaches, and they were worried about the procyclical dimensions of the regulation 
developed. Developing countries had experienced a series of financial crises in the immediate 
past and, being more aware of their costs, gave greater priority to preventing crises. Their lack 
of participation in the Basel Committee could have, therefore, biased decisions in favour of 




Table 1: The composition of membership of regulatory organisations 
Members per country in July 2009 (N: new countries since September 2008; members 







Australia A (2) N A N
Belgium A A
Brazil N (3) N N N
Canada A (3) A A (2) A
China N (3) N N N
France A (3) A A A
Germany A (3) A A A
Hong Kong A (1) N A A
India N (3) N N N
Indonesia N (1) N
Italy A (3) A A  A
Japan A (3) A A  A
Luxemburg A
Mexico N (2) N A N
Netherlands A (2) A A A
Rusia N (3) N N
Saudi Arabia N (1) N N
Singapur A (1) N A
South Africa N (1) N N
South Korea N (2) N N
Spain N (2) A A
Sweden A A
Switzerland A (2) A A A
Turkey N (1) N
Great Britain A (3) A A A





In the midst of the global financial crisis and driven, as we have seen, by the decision of the 
G-20 of November 2008, an important number of those institutions widened their 
membership, particularly to include so-called emerging economies. Table 1 summarizes  the 
changes to the regulatory organisations. In early 2009, the Technical Committee of the 
International Organization of Securities Commissions, which apart from Mexico had not 
previously included any other developing country among its members, included among its 
members Brazil, China and India. In March 2009, the Basel Committee included for the first 
time various developing countries (Brazil, China, the Republic of Korea, India and Mexico), 
as well as Australia and Russia. In July 2009, it widened its membership still further, 




Saudi Arabia, South Africa and Turkey) as well as Hong Kong and Singapore. As Graphic 1 
shows, that closed a large gap in the degree of representativeness of the Basel Committee, in 
relation to the countries that supervised the 50 largest banks in the world. However, countries 
with relatively small banks are not adequately represented which means banking regulation 
continues to excessively meet the interests of the large banks in the main industrialised 
countries. At the same time, the Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems (CPSS) 
invited the following members: Australia, Brazil, China, India, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, 
South Africa and the Republic of Korea. This is another organisation based in Basel which 
serves as a forum to the Central Banks to monitor national payment systems as well as cross-
border and multiple-currency agreements. 
 
Graphic 1: Percentage of the 50 largest banks in the world (by market capitalisation) 













In the second quarter of 2009, the Financial Stability Forum increased its number of 
members to include all the members of the G-20, which includes most large developing 
countries as well as Spain and the European Commission. It was given the new name 
Financial Stability Board (FSB) to reflect its additional powers. This enlargement to the 
membership was also significant; as Graphic 2 shows, if measured in terms of world reserve 







Graphic 2: Representation of the Financial Stability Forum/Board (FSF/FSB) measured 















This increase in the participation of developing countries in the FSB is, of course, a positive 
step. However, it throws up two problems. The first is to do with the number of 
representatives of different countries. With enlargement, three different categories of 
countries were created: the BRIC (Brazil, China, India, Russia) joined the G-7 group of 
countries, with three representatives each, while Australia, Mexico, the Netherlands, Spain, 
the Republic of Korea and Switzerland assigned two and the rest given one (Argentina, Hong 
Kong, Indonesia, Singapore, Saudi Arabia, South Africa and Turkey). Therefore, (with the 
exception of the BRICs), the emerging economies represented in the FSB have one or two 
representatives while the G-7 have three, and even worse, the poorest economies and the 
small and medium-sized countries do not have any representation. 
The second problem is to do with the fact that the FSB is now not only structured around a 
plenary session but also around a Committee for Initiatives and three additional committees. 
While this enlargement and specialisation is welcome since it strengthens its role, it is striking 
that all the heads of those five bodies come from developed countries. A greater diversity 
would be desirable in the future. One interesting example, which could be imitated, is that of 
the four working groups set up by the G-20 between November 2008 and April 2009. Each 
working group was headed by one developed country and another from a developing country. 
This is the root of some of the additional reforms that need to be introduced. We will 
underline three here. The first is the inclusion of representatives of small and medium-sized 
countries on the regulatory bodies. That would ensure that their concerns would be listened to 
– for instance, the preference for simpler regulation, as well as for small and medium-sized 
countries having greater regulatory powers to regulate the large international banks which are 
active in their countries (see the Warwick Commission, 2009, on this respect). That could also 
lead to regulation reflecting the interests and preferences of the largest international banks to a 
lesser degree and regulation would be more appropriate for regulate smaller, nationally 
focused banks. One alternative would be to establish regional representatives instead of 
individual nations on regulatory organisations (with perhaps just a few exceptions such as 
some important countries). Those representatives could be chosen by the countries of each 




rules on rotation to guarantee that small and medium-sized countries are represented. The 
model of representation used by the IASB could be useful here. (see footnote 2). A system of 
regional representation would also have the advantage that all the countries would have at 
least one indirect representative. This fact, as well as the representation of small and medium-
sized countries would also have the advantage of increasing the legitimacy and efficiency of 
those organisations. Introducing such changes soon is, moreover, urgent in order to avoid the 
new structures becoming antiquated. 
Secondly, it is important to include better systems of holding regulatory organisations to 
account, through national parliaments in the case of national regulators, to which in the future 
international regulatory organisations and multilateral representative institutions should be 
added (United Nations 2009).  
Finally, the benefits of including developing countries in key international regulatory 
organisations could be reinforced by the creation of a Technical Secretariat to support them in 
their interactions with those organisations. This Secretariat could prepare, or be in charge of 
studies, provide a forum for debate between developing countries and help – when 
appropriate – to define the positions of those countries, especially those which require 
international action and/or that of developed countries. One example is the possible 
international regulation of the “carry trade” which could have procyclical effects, which is a 
subject of particular interest to developing countries. In this process the main group of 
developing countries could play a particular role for the G-24 in areas related to the Monetary 
Fund and the World Bank. 
 
3.  REGULATORY  FRAGMENTATION:  TOWARDS  A  GLOBAL  FINANCIAL 
REGULATOR? 
International prudential regulation has developed in a weak and fragmented international 
context. But finance is globally integrated and, therefore, there is an imbalance between the 
global growth of the financial sector and the international regulatory structure. In the past, 
regulation and financial supervision have been fundamentally national. The majority of 
regulatory financial agreements simply acquired the form of standard “Best practices” and 
“Principles” which were not legally binding. Developing countries often found themselves 
obliged to follow those standards either because it was a condition of the IMF or World Bank 
rules, or because the financial markets pressurised them indirectly to do so. That is improper. 
The need to expand the world’s regulatory spaces is in keeping with the principle that for 
regulation to be efficient the regulator’s domain should be the same as the market that it is 
regulating. Important parts of the markets and financial institutions are global; consequently, 
the regulation should also be global. Moreover, financial activity and risk taking will quickly 
grow in areas where there are gaps in the regulation or where those gaps give way to 
regulatory arbitrage. 
A global financial regulator would design standards to be applied to all countries and 
jurisdictions and it would adopt supervision mechanisms to guarantee their application. This 




whose financial systems have an impact on the global system. Nevertheless, the regulator 
should allow regulation to be adapted to the different conditions of each country, operating, 
therefore, as a network of national regulators with strong international coordination. That 
would follow the principle that global regulation be based on good national regulation 
(Stiglitz, 2010). For example, the criterion of anticyclical regulation could be internationally 
agreed; nevertheless, as has been highlighted, its instruments would work at a national level in 
relation with the state of the cycle in each country. That is one of the reasons why, as the 
United Nations (2009) and Brunnermeier et al. (2009) argue, it is better for international bank 
subsidiaries to be subject to the regulation of the country where they are based. Additionally, 
national financial institutions without global connections would continue to be nationally 
regulated (Reddy, 2010). 
 Given the difficulty of reaching a consensus for the creation of new international institutions 
it would be a good idea to adapt one or more of the existing ones. One suitable one which 
could be adapted would be the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) given its interest in 
the systemic risk in financial markets and the need to regulate them, the high quality of its 
analysis and its close ties to central banks and regulatory entities. Nevertheless, a prerequisite 
for this institution being transformed into a global financial authority would be a considerable 
enlargement of the membership to make it a global institution. It would also be essential for 
the Financial Stability Board, to which the BIS contributes a Secretariat, to be a central part of 
the global regulator.  
Additionally, there should be a close process of consultation with the IMF on elements of 
macroeconomic risks, both at a global level as well as at the level of each country. There is, 
however, agreement that the IMF is not the appropriate financial institution to assume the 
challenge of global regulator. For reasons of macroeconomic stability, countries will be 
allowed to divide their markets with regulations on cross-border capital flows, as the Articles 
of Agreement of the Fund set out. The regulation of those capital flows could be a good idea, 
especially if the financial regulation is seen as insufficient to reduce the volatility of capital 
flows. 
It is important to ensure that the new global regulator is not just effective and efficient but 
also representative. That is why it is important for developing countries to be adequately 
represented, in accordance with the criteria outlined in the previous section. 
One reason why governments, both in developed as well as developing countries, resist the 
creation of a global regulator is that they do not wish to relinquish national sovereignty in the 
field of financial regulation. However, this perception is misguided since the globalisation of 
private finance means that national authorities already no longer have full control over the 
conditions that determine the financial stability of their respective countries. That is why 
instead of giving up their sovereignty, efforts to coordinate between countries through a 
global regulator should be understood as an exercise in shared sovereignty, which will allow 






For some time there have been various proposals for “innovative sources of financing” that 
would allow both the United Nations’ official aid for development target to be met (0.7% of 
gross national income for industrialised countries) as well as the provision of global public 
goods. This matter has been explored in academic terms (see, among others, the essays 
collected in Atkinson, 2005) and has received repeated support in different United Nations 
summits since 2000, including the Monterrey Summit. The greatest advance in the 
corresponding international debates was achieved at the World Leaders’ Summit on Action 
against Hunger and Poverty, which took place at the United Nations in 2004, which 
highlighted the advantages of predictability and potential stability of such innovative flows. 
Some of those innovative flows have begun to be adopted by some countries, in particular in 
the form of special taxes on air tickets and the emission of bonds backed by cash flow 
expected from official aid for development (the so-called international finance facility), which 
allows advance payment on the paying of such resources. In both cases, such resources have 
been used to finance international initiatives in the field of public health. Studies already 
completed show, however, that the greatest flows come from taxes on carbon emissions and 
those on financial transactions. This last one merits some attention in this paper because of its 
relationship to the matters we are discussing. 
The financial crisis has awakened a strong increase in interest in taxes on financial 
transactions, which have received recent support not just from civil society but also from the 
government of various industrialised countries. This proposal has recently received the 
support of the former Prime Minister and the head of financial regulation in Great Britain, the 
country with the largest financial centre in the world in currency trading. Similarly, the 
leaders of France and Germany have given important backing to such an idea, which has also 
won strong support from other European countries such as Spain, Norway and Belgium, as 
well as Japan, and the President of the Congress of US representatives. 
There are various important reasons for such strong support for a tax on financial transactions. 
Firstly, even a small tax (of 0.005%) applied exclusively to large currency transactions in the 
main currencies could generate a significant sum: more than US$30 billion a year (see 
Schmidt, 2008, and Spratt, 2006, on this). Those resources are critical at a moment in which 
the global crisis has caused a significant rise in deficits and levels of public debt in developed 
countries, which has reduced the possibility of attaining the goals on official aid for 
development just as the crisis has also increased poverty in many developing countries, 
making it difficult to reach the Millennium development goals. Moreover, governments all 
over the world need additional resources to fund investment in developing countries to fight 
climate change at the same time that the global crisis makes it less probable that the private 
sector will fund such investment. The fact that a high proportion of large currency trades are 
carried out by high-earning individuals or specialised financial agents, including alternative 
investment funds, also make the imposition of a tax on those transactions attractive. 
The second reason why the idea of charging taxes on financial transactions is becoming 
increasingly attractive, particularly on currency transactions, is that the charge would be 




systems would reduce collection costs and also reduce the risk of significant evasion of the 
tax. 
Thirdly, political backing for such a tax is greater than before given the perception that the 
behaviour of the financial sector was one of the main causes of the current crisis. As a small 
tax, the amounts charged would not affect the functioning of the currency markets nor 
significantly reduce the volume of their business. 
There is also a large tradition of applying taxes to financial transactions at a national level, 
including in Great Britain (the very effective stamp duty on all share sales of 0.5%, in other 
words 100 times more than the tax proposed above to currency trades). Stamp duties on 
mortgage deals and some other financial deals are also normal in a lot of countries such as the 
United States. In Latin America, various countries have for several years set taxes on internal 
financial transactions and sometimes on external ones; Brazil is the one that stands out most. 
Some commentators have, moreover, said that the fact that the currency markets are tax free 
despite their high volume is a real anomaly, which should be corrected (Spraat, 2006). Capital 
income reserves, applied at different times by Spain, Chile and Colombia, have similar effects 
(and, in fact, in some cases might be substituted by a payment for the equivalent cost of 
opportunity) and Malaysia introduced a tax on capital being taken out of the country during 
the Asian crisis. 
It is worth highlighting that the proposal to tax financial deals has a long and distinguished 
theoretical tradition. The need to correct the difference generated by negative externalities 
between the marginal public and private profits of a determined economic activity, by means 
of taxation, has been recognised at least since Pigou (1920). John Maynard Keynes, in The 
General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, proposed more specifically a small tax 
on financial transactions, especially on the stock exchanges, in order to mitigate the volatility 
generated by the speculative excesses of some market agents (Keynes, 1936). The US Nobel 
prize-winning economist James Tobin proposed along the same lines in 1972 a tax of 1% on 
currency transactions. In 1996, however, he said such a tax should be considerably lower, at 
maybe 0.1%. As Tobin explained (1996), the proposal had two aims: make the exchange rates 
reflect fundamental long-term factors to a great extent, not just short-term expectations and 
risks, and make national macroeconomic policies more independent. Seeing that such a tax 
could increase significant resources, he suggested that they be used for international purposes. 
The “Tobin tax”, as it has become known, was widely debated, especially after large financial 
crises, and was supported by economists of varying points of view (Jeffrey Frankel, Peter 
Kenen, Paul Krugman, Joseph Stiglitz, Lawrence Summers and John Williamson, among 
others). Recently, a new generation of theoretical models have sprung up based on the 
“microstructure” of markets (for example Shi and Xu, 2009), which can be characterises as 
“fundamentalist” agents, which tend to reduce volatility, and “noise traders” (speculators), 
which increase volatility. Those models, as well as others, tend to conclude that a tax, as long 
as it were small, would tend to reduce volatility in currency markets. 
In recent years, though, the proposals to create a tax on currency transactions (currency 
transaction tax, or CTT) have varied compared to the initial suggestions of Tobin (see, for 
example, Landau, 2004; Nissanke, 2005; Spratt, 2006). In the context of the search for 
innovative sources for financing development, a very small international tax (of 0.005%) on 




by Tobin, both in its goal, which now would be to raise additional resources and not to act as 
a disincentive to speculative flows as such, as well as in the sum proposed, which is much 
smaller, precisely to avoid distorting the currency market. The proposed tax now would be 
applied not only to spot market transactions but also to foreign exchange derivative trades 
whose important has risen significantly in recent decades. Given the high volume of currency 
transactions, estimated at around US$3 billion a day, it is estimated that a tax of this type 
could raise more than US$30 billion a year (Schmidt, 2008). 
It is important to underscore that as a result of the bankruptcy of Herstatt Bank in 1974 and its 
negative effect on the international settlements system, the regulatory authorities, the central 
banks and private banks have taken a series of measures to reduce risk in the payment 
systems. That led to the establishment of the Real Time Gross Settlements System (RTGS) 
that aimed to eliminate the systemic risk in currency transactions. That means that all the 
transactions in foreign currencies are carried out in real time and in a centralised way. There is 
a series of institutions that support these activities, which are very centralised and have very 
full registers, such as SWIFT and the CLS bank. Together with the benefits of recent 
developments in technology, this makes it easy and inexpensive to charge taxes on currency 
transactions. Ideally, the tax would be introduced at a multilateral level (or, better still, 
applied to the main currencies), but various recent studies have shown that it could be applied 
to key individual currencies (detailed studies have been done on that on the euro and pound 
sterling). 
It is worth highlighting that as a result of the global crisis, the authorities in the main financial 
centres are trying to increase transparency and the centralisation of all financial instruments 
and deals, including over-the-counter derivative deals or credit default swaps, among others. 
Once such measures are introduced, a small tax on financial transactions could be considered 
and used at least in part to finance development. However, that should be considered as a 
second stage. What could be immediately implemented is a small tax on currency 
transactions, to gain additional resources to fund development and with some desirable 
effects, albeit limited ones, on the volatility of the markets. This seems to be an idea whose 









Macroeconomic coordination, supervision of macroeconomic policies and financial regulation 
all share the fundamental goal of preventing crises. International financial architecture should 
also count on good mechanisms to deal with crises, in particular to avoid them starting in one 
country or one group of countries and spreading to others – the phenomenon which is now 
called “contagion”. 
One central problem of current international financial architecture in this field is the absence 
of a good mechanism to handle debt crises, similar to the bankruptcy regulation that exists in 
all national legislation. For more than half a century the Paris Club has been operating, which 
serves as a framework for debt renegotiation with the official organisations of the 
industrialised countries. The London Club was set up in 1976, which serves as an informal 
framework for the renegotiation of private bank credits. 
Time and again, however, the main debt renegotiations have taken place outside those 
frameworks. That was the case with the negotiations between private banks and developing 
countries during the debt crisis of the 1980s, which was driven directly by the economic 
authorities in the United States, especially through the Baker and Brady plans of the mid to 
late eighties. The Brady plan proved a definitive solution, albeit a late one, to the crisis. In the 
case of public debts, the main renegotiation have taken the framework of the Heavily Indebted 
Poor Countries Initiatives, better known by its abbreviation HIPC, launched in 1996 and 
strengthened in 1999, and the subsequent Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative of 2005. 
Those frameworks have two fundamental deficiencies. The first is that the restructuring 
initiatives have always arrived late when the debt problems have severely affected the 
countries, and indirectly also the creditors, which have been affected by the lower ability of 
their debtors to pay, due to their high level of indebtedness. The second deficiency is that the 
existing mechanisms do not guarantee equal treatment of different debtors nor of different 
creditors. In fact, a repeated criticism of the member countries of the Paris Club is that the 
private creditors do not accept the restructuring conditions agreed by the members of the Club 
and they benefit, by contrast, due to the lower burden which these processes impose on the 
them.. 
There is not, on the other hand, any multilateral framework for dealing with crises in the 
international bond markets. There have been numerous proposals since the 1970s to create 
international bankruptcy courts or forums for mediation or eventual arbitration. These 
initiatives proliferated after the Mexican crisis at the end of 1994 and, especially after the 
Asian crisis in 1997. The corresponding proposals have come from both sectors on the right 




to private credits is an essential prerequisite for the good functioning of the financial markets, 
as well as from the left who see excess leverage as a clear obstacle to development. 
The most important initiative was the one led by the IMF in 2001-2003, under the name 
Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism (SDRM). This was rejected by both the United 
States, under clear pressure from its financial sector, as well as by various developing 
countries that feared that a mechanism of this nature would end up limiting or increasing their 
costs of accessing the international capital markets. There was also a clear opposition from 
some sectors to the IMF leading debt renegotiations given its clear conflict of interest (since it 
is also a creditor) and its rejection of the conditionality of its credits. This is why ad hoc 
negotiations continued to be the norm, initiated by indebted countries stopping servicing their 
debt, often in open confrontation with their creditors. The most notorious example in recent 
years is, of course, the renegotiation of Argentina’s debt. 
One of the main problems of all these mechanisms is that those parties that do not follow the 
terms of the agreements can go to the courts in the industrialised countries to defend their 
rights. An alternative solution to this problem was the rapid generalised use, between 2003-
2005, of collective action clauses in the issuing of bonds in the United States, a mechanism 
that was already used in other markets, especially in the English market. This mechanism 
defines the majorities necessary to restructure a private bond issue. This alternative had been 
increasingly favoured since the Mexican crisis but it received its final impetus as a result of 
the search by the US government and financial sector to alternative solutions to the IMF 
initiative. As well as the collective action clauses, some “codes of conduct” were added, 
among those which stand out the “Principles for stable capital flows and fair debt 
restructuring in emergency markets” adopted in 2005 by the Institute of International Finance, 
a private organisation composed of large international banks. 
Although it is still soon to judge if this route, a more decentralised and market-orientated route, 
is producing the desired effects, the need to count on a multilateral framework for debt 
resolution problems, which would be legally enforceable in the main financial markets, 
doubtlessly remains one of the main subjects that still needs to be addressed in the international 
financial architecture. An institution of this type would, moreover, also have the benefit that it 
would correct the two main flaws in the ad hoc structure which have arisen over time: it would 
allow restructurings that benefit both creditors as well as debtors (the essence of a good 
agreement in this field, in accordance with the relevant national legislation on bankruptcy) and 
it would give equal treatment to different debtors and creditors3. The recent United Nations 
Commission on monetary and international financial matters has put some alternative 
proposals on the table in this field (United Nations, 2009). 
2. THE IMF’S EMERGENCY FINANCING 
Despite the flaws highlighted, since the Second World War, the international community has 
been able to count on emergency financing from the IMF during balance of payment crises. 
As Graphic 3 shows, this mechanism provided increasing anticyclical financing until the start 
of this decade, especially during the debt crisis of the eighties and the succession of crises that 
                                                 




began in 1994: Mexico, eastern Asia, Russia, South America and Turkey. One of its 
overriding characteristics was the tendency to concentrate financing on a few large debtors 
that were considered critical after 1994 in order to avoid the contagion of the financial crises 
and/or to avoid serious problems for the banks in developed countries (Mexico, Argentina and 
Russia; the Republic of Korea, Indonesia and Thailand; then Russia again; and Brazil, 
Argentina and Turkey, in this order chronologically). Following this pattern, the IMF 
increased its loans significantly in 2008, and especially in 2009, to countries affected by the 
global crisis. For the first time in a long time, the IMF included a high income country among 
its potential beneficiaries – Island – as well as emerging and low income countries. 
 























































































After the Mexican crisis, the need to create new credit lines to mitigate balance of payment 
crises, caused by abrupt interruptions in external financing or capital being withdrawn, began 
to be recognised. This problem is exacerbated by the fact that the procyclical behaviour of 
capital flows to developing countries reduces the margin for adopting anticyclical 
macroeconomic policies and the conditionality of IMF credits tends to reinforce the 
procyclical behaviour of those policies. In fact, the absence of a multilateral framework aimed 
at supporting the adoption of anticyclical macroeconomic policies could be considered as the 
main deficiency of IMF actions in developing countries. 
Here it is worth highlighting, however, that the IMF has been adopting a more flexible 




Asian crisis. In fact, in the face of the recessionary risks that the world economy faced, it has 
taken an openly anticyclical perspective on the economic policies that industrialised countries 
and, with greater caution, developing countries, should adopt.  
In the context of the financial crises which the developing world faced after the Asian crisis, the 
IMF created two new credit facilities. The first, the Supplemental Reserve Facility, created in 
1997, which served as a framework for the large loans made during the crises at the end of the 
twentieth century and the start of this century. The other, the Contingent Credit Line, had a 
more preventive aim. The last was never used because using it was perceived as an indicator of 
vulnerability, and it was suspended in 2003. In 2006 the IMF proposed an alternative line, 
called the Reserve Augmentation Line, which was under discussion for a long time. Although 
the proposal was positive in some respects, since it was automatic, doubts were raised about the 
prequalification process and the scale of the resources. For those reasons it was not used. 
For the poorest countries, the structural adjustment lines created in the mid eighties were 
transformed in 1999 in to the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility, in order to explicitly put 
the focus on poverty reduction. In January 2006, a credit line was added for those countries 
aimed at facilitating recovery after negative shocks – not just commercial ones but also natural 
disasters – and conflicts in neighbouring countries. Curiously, the creation of that line has 
coincided with a weakening of the traditional IMF loan, the Compensatory Finance Facility, 
which was designed to cope with negative commercial shocks (especially the deterioration in 
exchange conditions in middle-income countries). That facility languished due to its excessive 
conditions and was finally eliminated. 
As well as the deficiencies in the credit lines, there was also another problem which has made 
the IMF the source of repeated criticism: the excessive conditionality of its programmes, which 
have historically included openly procyclical clauses on macroeconomic adjustment, structural 
conditions which many countries and analysts have considered antidemocratic because they are 
not based on decisions by representative national authorities, and the use of the IMF green light 
for macroeconomic programmes which accompany the official development aid (the 
“gatekeeper” function of those programmes, as it has often been called). The excessive 
conditionality, as well as the absence of credit lines to tackle a world characterised by a high 
mobility of highly procyclical capital, especially towards medium-income economies, and 
important fluctuations in exchange terms in poor countries, are some of the most serious 
problems which this organisation faced in designing its crisis management mechanisms when 
the financial turmoil of 2007 began.  
Those problems were tackled, at least partially, as a result of the global crisis. In March 2009, 
the IMF created the Flexible Credit Line (FCL), which had preventative purposes, for countries 
with solid fundamentals but a risk of facing problems in their capital account. This line has been 
used by three countries (Colombia, Mexico and Poland), although it has not been drawn by any 
of them. The fact that it has not been used by other countries could indicate that it is not 
attractive and that perhaps the countries which have used it did it more as a show of support to 
the IMF decisions than out of necessity. Reflecting the discussions surrounding similar credit 
lines in the past, the additional problem of this line is that it artificially designs countries into 
groups, between those which have “good” policies and those which the IMF classifies as not 
having good policies, which can obviously increase the risks that the market perceives the 




This is why the other reforms adopted in March 2009 were probably of greater importance. The 
first of them was to double the other credit lines and to allow a wider use of the ordinary Fund 
agreements (the stand-by agreements) for preventive purposes (the so-called “high-access 
precautionary arrangements”. The second was to eliminate the relationship between payments 
and structural conditionality.  
In terms of low income countries, the IMF made new announcements about its concessional 
credit lines (IMF, 2009d). Apart from doubling the credit limits, in accordance with the March 
reforms – which, although courageous, implies low levels of loans as a proportion of the 
external shocks in comparison with the emerging economies –  it increased the global 
capacity of the loans to US$17 billion until 2014. The new Poverty Reduction and Growth 
Facility (PRGF), through which these initiatives are run, includes three facilities; (i) the 
Extended Credit Facility (ECF), which replaces the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility 
(PRGF) and provides help to countries with difficulties in their balance of payments, and lasts 
various years; (ii) the stand-by lines, which can now be used for dealing with external shocks 
(which used to be addressed through a special credit line) and the precautionary needs of 
concessionary conditions; and (iii) a rapid credit facility for support during emergencies (like 
a natural disaster or a temporary external shock) with a limited conditionality, called the 
Rapid Credit Facility (RCF). The IMF also decided that all low-income countries would 
receive an exceptional cancellation of all owed interest payments until the end of 2011 on 
concessionary loan lines, as well as lower rates of interest on future loans.  
In December 2009, the IMF reformed its concessional loan lines from a single design to a 
menu of options (IMF, 2009f). The menu aimed to be more flexible to different situations 
facing low-income countries in relation to their vulnerability to debt and their macroeconomic 
and public finance management capacity (“capacity” in the terminology of the agreement). 
Within this framework, each one of the two factors mentioned previously could take two 
values: one “inferior” or “superior”. In this way, the framework determines four different 
concessionary options. Unless the sustainability of the debt is a serious worry (which would 
be a high value) and the capacity is limited, non-concessionary loans are allowed. On the 
other hand, countries where the vulnerabilities of the debt are relatively high will always be 
subject to concessionality. 
In this framework, low “capacity” countries with a high vulnerability to the debt are subject to 
a minimum concessionary threshold of 35%, applied to each loan separately. In countries with 
lower vulnerabilities to the debt, the threshold is set at 35% and there is room for non-
concessionary loans, based on the sustainability analysis of the debt. For countries with 
greater capacity which have a larger debt vulnerability, the annual limits would be set based 
on the average debt accumulation in terms of the present value. Lastly, for countries with the 
best position, those with greater capacity and lower debt vulnerabilities, a minimum 
concessionary average is set but that can be completely removed if it is considered 
appropriate. 
Lastly, and in response to the criticisms associated with conditionality, the IMF programme 
for low-income countries is aimed at reinforcing the links between Fund supported 
programmes and the national Poverty Reduction Strategies (PRS), including the critical 
increase in social spending during the downturn by countries with low levels of debt 




discretionary expenditure aimed at temporarily supporting the economy and/pr to cut the 
fiscal deficit once the economy starts to recover (IMF, 2009e). 
The history of the last decade indicates, therefore, that the international system demands the 
IMF to be more active as a last resort creditor and as guarantor of the stability of the 
international financial system, but also to be more dynamic in the awarding of emergency 
financing subject to lower levels of conditionality. The responses it has adopted during the crisis 
are an improvement but it needs to continue making progress on designing financing 
mechanisms with sufficient resources, that are automatic and which have a simple 
prequalification process to deal with the external shocks that developing countries face, 
especially those coming from the capital account, an issue which particularly affects medium-
income countries, and the trade shocks that low-income countries face. 
3. THE PREVENTIVE RESPONSES OF THE DEVELOPING WORLD 
The two problems noting in IMF financing – excessive conditionality and the lack of 
appropriate credit lines – as well as the evidence that the risks implied by the procyclical nature 
of the capital movements which affect them, explain one of the most generalised approaches 
which the developing world has adopted in the last few years: a massive accumulation of 
international reserves. In contrast to the debt crisis resolution mechanisms and emergency 
financing of the IMF, this approach is preventive in nature and, in fact, decisively contributes to 
the lower vulnerability of these countries in the recent crisis. 
The international reserves of developing countries multiplied by five between 2001 and the 
end of 2008, reaching 4.4 trillion dollars (Graphic 4). By contrast, industrialised countries did 
not face a similar pressure and the increase reflected in the graphic is due almost exclusively 
to the balance of payments surplus in Japan. In the case of developing countries, accumulating 
reserves has been seen as a mechanism of “insurance” against possible financial crises and to 
avoid the excessive conditionality of the IMF. The international situation which characterised 
the boom which took place in the developing world between 2003 and mid 2008, 
characterised by abundant, cheap international financing and easy prices in basic goods, 
facilitated the accumulation. As graph 3 indicates, one of its effects was the massive fall in 





Gráfico 4: International Reserves 































It is worthwhile adding that another mechanism with precautionary effects that was 
extensively used in the developing world after the Asian crisis was internal bond markets 
(public, but also increasingly, private), especially in national currencies (Ocampo and Tovar, 
2008). The development of this market has aimed to overcome the imbalance in external 
liabilities, which implies, as we saw, that the depreciations that took place during crises tend 
to excessively increase the burden of foreign liabilities. The development of an increasing 
number of institutional investors in industrialised countries which invest in developing 
countries and the better debt security ratings of those countries (due both to the greater 
guarantee which growing international reserves offer) also contributed to this result although 
they might have generated new means of procyclical behaviour in external financing to the 
extent in which those flows respond to the expected behaviour of exchange rates in 
developing countries throughout the cycle (appreciation during the booms, depreciation 
during crises). 
The accumulation of reserves for insurance reasons was, doubtlessly, a rational response at 
the level of individual countries to the risks of instability in the international financial system. 
We should point, however, that this mechanism has costs both for the countries as well as at a 
systemic level. Firstly, it involves the accumulation of assets whose performance is generally 
lower than that of foreign liabilities, and carrying out policies to “sterilise” the monetary 
effects of reserve accumulation that are very costly when internal interest rates significantly 
exceed the international rates, which is often the case (Rodrik, 2006). Secondly, reserve 
accumulation has “composition effects” that contribute to global imbalances. In order to 
accumulate reserves, developing countries tend to run a surplus in their balance sheet or to 
accumulate liquid liabilities, which creates a global recessive bias unless it is accompanied 




However, such deficit and liability accumulation cannot be sustainable and they generate 
corrections with both macroeconomic costs as well as costs to the financial sector. As we 
have already stated in the second section of this paper, if this behaviour is maintained, it could 
cause new imbalances in the coming years. We will return to this subject in the following 
section. 
Finally, we should underscore that the Asian crisis led to a very important regional initiative, 
the Chiang Mai Initiative, adopted in 2000 by the ASEAN countries, China, Japan, the 
Republic of Korea (ASEAN + 3). The mechanism was initially conceived as a collection of 
reciprocal bilateral credits between the central banks of the member countries. Using this 
mechanism, countries could automatically pay out up to 20% (initially 10%) of the maximum 
of the credit lines agreed, from when they were obliged to adopt an IMF programme, which 
meant that the regional financing was seen as complementary and not a substitute to the IMF. 
In 2005, it was further agreed to make the credit lines agreed multilateral, so that, in 
accordance with the decisions adopted in 2007, a common reserve fund would be operate, but 
managed by each one of the countries and subject to a single contractual agreement. The 
corresponding multilateral agreement was signed in December 2009 and included resources 
totalling 120 billion dollars. 
We should also add that an institution of this type was set up in the 1960s in Latin America, 
the Latin American Reserve Fund (which, despite its name, also has Andean countries as 
members, Costa Rica and Uruguay). In the last few years, an extensive number of regional 
and sub-regional macroeconomic policy agreements have been concluded, in keeping with 
macroeconomic sustainability, in the style of those adopted by members of the euro area (the 
Maastricht criteria). 
The history of the last decade indicates, therefore, that an IMF that is more active as a lender of 
last resort and as a guarantor for the stability of the international financial system would reduce 
the national costs of the insurance policies of developing countries and would contribute to 
reducing the enormous imbalances in the balance of payments that characterise the world 
economy. Regional financing mechanisms could play a complementary role in this task and, in 
fact, the IMF should be seen in the future more as a network of reserve funds than as a mere 
global fund (Ocampo, 2006). A structure of this type would contribute both to global financial 
stability as well as to reducing world economic imbalances. 
 
4. REFORMING THE GOVERNANCE OF THE WORLD BANK AND THE IMF 
The tendency of developing countries to use unilateral solutions has also responded to their 
perception that they have an insufficient participation in international financial organisations. 
This has created a debate, which continues today, about changes to the votes and 
representation of those countries in the IMF and the World Bank.  
In April 2008, a modest agreement was adopted on reforming quotas and votes in the IMF 
Board, which implies a redistribution of the quotas and a tripling of the basic votes to increase 
the voting rights of developing countries (including the emerging economies) by 2.7% as a 




members representing at least 85% of total votes, and only 70 members, representing about 
73% of the votes had done so at the time of writing of this paper. It is clear that ratification is 
a priority. 
The ministers in the developing and transitional countries asked in the meetings of spring 
2010 for an ambitious additional realignment of the quotas, which would imply an increase of 
7% in the quotas of developing countries, mainly benefiting emerging economies. The 
specific reforms demanded by the developing countries demand greater weight being given 
for GDP to purchasing power parity and for more precise measures to be adopted in 
accordance with the needs of the borrowers, through an adequate assessment of the volatility 
that different countries face. One interesting reform that has been proposed that fits with the 
expectations of developing countries is to reduce the proportion of European votes in the IMF 
Board but to consolidate all the European Union seats in one, which would allow Europe to 
speak with a single voice in the Directory and even to increase its influence in this 
organisation. 
An important proposal made on various occasions and that was reiterated by the IMF’s 
Commission for Governance Reform, headed by Trevor Manuel (FMI, 2009c), is for the 
threshold of votes needed to approve important political changes in the IMF to be reduced 
from the current 85% to, for example, 70-75%. That would mean that the United States could 
no longer exercise a veto in the IMF Board on important policy decisions. This Commission 
also proposed accelerating the process to reform the quotas, that all seats were elected and 
that a Council of Ministers be formed to adopt the most important political decisions of the 
institution. 
For its part, in the spring 2010 meetings, the World Bank approved a transfer of 3.13% of 
voting power from the developed economies to the developing and transition economies 
(DTEs, which include Saudi Arabia and South Korea). The DTEs will now hold 47.19% of 
voting power at the World Bank, and they have received a promise that they will reach parity 
in the near future. The greatest increase was for  China, which gained 1.65% to become the 
Bank’s third shareholder. The increases were mainly concentrated in middle-income 
countries, especially in Asia, which were under-represented, while low-income countries saw 
limited change. In the case of the developed countries, the European Union and Japan will see 
their voting power reduces but not the United States. The developing and transition countries 
saw this reform as a step in the right direction towards equal voting power at the World Bank, 
as expressed in the G-24 statement of April 2010.  
The change in voting power will be achieved through an ad hoc capital increase. The 
objective is, however, to develop a formula based on principles for the next revision in 2015; 
developing countries expressed their clear preference for a more ambitious calendar. That 
reflects the fact that during the spring meetings there was no agreement on a new formula of 
dynamic participation, one which would capture the changing economic weight of the 
countries and the contributions to the development remit of the World Bank. Disagreements 
arose because many shareholders considered those principles, which followed the G-20 
commitments at the Pittsburgh meeting in 2009 and the annual IMF/World Bank meeting in 
Istanbul, were not applied to the Bank’s proposal, which was based almost totally in the 
economic weight of the countries. The Bank’s development mission is important both for 




Association (IDA) and for borrowers from the developing world it is important to assign votes 
in accordance with the size of contributions to the IDA in order to incentivise larger 
contributions to the capital enlargement of the Association, which will benefit low-income 
countries. For medium-sized income countries it is also important to bear in mind the quality 
of their borrowers. 
Finally, it is crucial for the heads of the IMF and the World Bank as well as the senior 
management  of those organisations to be chosen on the basis of transparent and open 
processes, based on the merit of the candidates, without their nationality being an issue. It is 
encouraging that in the spring 2009 meeting between the G-20 leaders those principle was 
approved, and now it should be applied.. It would also be useful for the personnel of these 
institutions to be more diverse, not just in terms of nationality but also in terms of education 




3. World macroeconomic imbalances and the 
reform of the international monetary system 
 
1. THE WORLD’S MACROECONOMIC IMBALANCES  
One field in which international financial architecture has monumentally failed is to provide a 
mechanism for guaranteeing consistent macroeconomic policies in the main economies in the 
world. These policies continue to be national in almost all countries, to a crucial degree in the 
economy which issues the main international currency, and a mix of regional and national 
policies in the euro zone, where monetary policy is now regional (although not for all 
members) but fiscal policies remain fundamentally national. That combined with an 
international monetary system and, in particular, with the world reserve system, which is still 
based to a large extent on a national currency, the US dollar. 
The reforms that have taken place over time have added some positive elements to this 
architecture but they have also suffered significant setbacks and conflicts during certain 
periods. The creation of the IMF at Bretton Woods represented the most important attempt to 
establish a mechanism for macroeconomic cooperation based on rules that would allow each 
country to also adopt policies aimed at guaranteeing full employment (internal balance) and to 
correct fundamental external deficits (external balance) without causing negative effects on 
the international economy or on other countries. Countries were allowed to vary their 
exchange rates but to avoid competitive devaluations, which had contributed to the Great 
Depression in the 1930s, and the IMF provided partial multilateral financing to avoid policies 
correcting the balance of payments to have recessive effects with negative impacts on other 
countries. The IMF also offered a multilateral mechanism for macroeconomic dialogue and 
cooperation. These forms of international cooperation were also reinforced with the creation 
in 1969 of a true international reserve currency, the Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) issued by 
the Fund. Of course, not all the elements were positive since the Bretton Woods agreement 
put the dual dollar-gold standard at the centre of the international monetary system, which 
generated its own instabilities and finally collapsed in the early 1960s.  
The collapse of the dollar-gold standard and the system of fixed parities and its substitution 
for a mechanism of variable parities between the main currencies introduced greater 
flexibility into the international economic system as well as more independence for national 
macroeconomic policies, at least for the main countries. It also introduced, however, new 
potential conflicts if the macroeconomic policies of the main economies were not moving in 
the same direction. In the last decade, for example, one endemic problem has been the 
imbalance between the trend by the US Federal Reserve to adopt clearly anticyclical policies 
and the reluctance (or, at least, greater caution) of the European Central Bank to do so. 
Possible tensions in monetary policy mean that the rise of alternative reserve currencies (the 
euro, in particular) -  which may have risen from the scrapping of the dollar-gold fixed parity 
and the tendency to demonetise gold – could exacerbate instead of cushion world financial 
volatility and be reflected in the instability in the main currency exchange rates. In any case, 




(two-thirds in the last decade, according to IMF statistics), which means that the scrapping of 
the dual gold-dollar standard gave way to one fundamentally based on a fiduciary dollar – a 
“fiduciary dollar standard” as we will call it here.  
The macroeconomic coordination mechanisms put in place since the sixties have also 
operated outside the IMF and have not been particularly effective. In the eighties they were 
agreed on an ad hoc basis between the main economies (the Hotel del Plaza 1985 and the 
Louvre 1987 Agreements) and subsequently they worked through dialogues within the Group 
of 7 (the G-7), which clearly left out the main developing countries. The IMF took an 
interesting step in April 2006 when it created a “multilateral supervision” mechanism, the aim 
of which was precisely to consider the macroeconomic and financial interrelations between 
members of the Fund. That process involves the euro zone, Saudi Arabia, China, Japan and 
the United States, and its objective was to reduce world economic imbalances without 
sacrificing economic growth. Although the motivation of the new mechanism was positive, its 
results can be qualified at best as modest. 
We should also mention that in June 2007 the IMF Board adopted a new resolution on 
supervision of countries’ exchange rate policies, the first in almost 30 years. This resolution 
put the principle of external stability at the centre of the Fund’s activities. To the old 
principles of currency exchange intervention, which already aimed to avoid exchange rate 
interventions which negatively affected other member countries, a new criterion was added: 
specifically to avoid exchange rate policies which generated external instability. From the 
outset China expressed strong reservations about this mechanism. 
One interesting step in the direction of increasing the number of agents that took part in the 
dialogues and eventually in macroeconomic cooperation was the G-20 decision in Pittsburgh 
in 2009 to designate that Group “as a priority forum for our international economic 
cooperation” under the multilateral supervision of the IMF. However, that solution was only a 
partial step forward in the necessary task of placing the IMF again at the centre of world 
macroeconomic policies, as intended in its original design. The solution also created problems 
because of the ad hoc nature of the cooperation mechanism adopted. 
The need for better macroeconomic coordination mechanisms became clear in the light of the 
large imbalances in trade balances that have characterised the world economy in recent 
periods and which are reviewed in Graphic 5. The strong external deficit of the United States 
and more recently those of the European Union contrast with the surplus of Japan, China and 
other developing countries, especially oil producers. The sharp increase in the deficit of the 
United States became acute during the Asian crisis when the expansion of the US economy 
served to cushion the recessive effects of that crisis at a world level. That deficit continued to 
grow until the middle of the last decade and was maintained at high levels until the start of the 
crisis despite the dollar’s trend towards depreciation which began in 2003. During the world 
boom of 2003-2007, the insurance policy of the developing countries contributed to the 
generation of those imbalances as well as to a peak in prices of basic goods, especially oil and 
metals. The principle reflection of this was the rapid increase in the United States’ net foreign 
liabilities – which reached US$2.1 trillion at the end of 2007 – and the strong depreciation of 





Gráfico 5: Balances in current account 





















It can also be added that world imbalances were reduced as a result of the world crisis and 
especially, as a result of the substantial cut in the United States’ deficit and in the surpluses of 
Japan and especially developing countries apart from China (see Graphic 5 again). 
Nevertheless, both the projections of the United Nations (2010) and the IMF (2009a) expect 
those imbalances to increase again from 2010 and subsequent years. The Fund’s projection 
for 2010, shown in the Graphic, also indicate a worrying trend: the deficit of the United States 
and the European Union continue to fall, but the surpluses of China and the other developing 
countries increased. These individual trends imply that their net effect will be to reduce 
demand in the world economy – in other words, they will have a recessive effect – and in 
practice they will not work out as projected since the surpluses and deficits in the world will 
necessarily have to compensate for one another. This reflects the need to maintain expansive 
policies at a world level while improving the mechanisms for coordinating national 
macroeconomic policies so that these recessive trends do not materialise. 
 
2. PROBLEMS WITH THE WORLD RESERVE SYSTEM 
The magnitude of the recent international financial crisis brought out into the light the 
problems of the international monetary system and, in particular, the relationship between the 
world reserve system and trade imbalances – and in a wider sense between the system and 
international economic stability. 
The world reserve system shows three fundamental deficiencies (Ocampo, 2009). All of them 
are related, in turn, to the fact that there is no mechanism, as highlighted earlier, to guarantee 
that surpluses and deficits in the trade balances of different countries offset one another 




The first problem, the one highlighted by John M. Keynes during the debates that led up to 
the creation of the Bretton Woods agreements, is that the present international monetary 
system – like all the systems that preceded it – has a bias against countries running a deficit 
(Keynes, 1942-1943). That tends to generate a global recessionary effect if the corrections 
that the countries in deficit need to adopt to balance their foreign trade accounts do not find 
financing in sufficient quantities (or if those countries do not think it is appropriate to 
maintain the deficits and the financing associated with them), and if, those adjustments are not 
offset by growth policies in the countries with surpluses. This problem can be called the 
antikeynesian bias. 
The second deficiency, which has become known as the Triffin dilemma, after the pioneering 
work by Robert Triffin (1961, 1968), is to do with the fact that an international reserve 
system based on one national currency (the US dollar) – and, more generally, a limited 
number of national or regional currencies (the euro currently) – is inherently instable. The 
only way the rest of the world can accumulate net assets in dollars is if the United States runs 
a current account deficit. But such deficits can lead to a loss of confidence in the dollar and, 
more generally, to strong cycles in the value of the main international currency and the 
current account of the country that issues it, which strongly affects the rest of the world 
economy. Deficits also encourage the excessive growth in credit in the United States and price 
bubbles in financial and property assets, which generate the risk of financial crises. 
 
Being the centre of the world monetary system means that, apart from the privilege of being 
the center of the system, the United States also benefits from having its deficits cheaply 
financed through the reserve accumulation of the rest of the world. Moreover, the United 
States also enjoys the additional privilege of being able to carry out a relatively autonomous 
monetary policy – and even to impose it on the rest of the world. The basic reason for this is 
the perception (and subsequent use) of the securities from the US Treasury as the “safest 
assets”, which means that the determinants of the US rates of interest are relatively 
independent of the dollar’s exchange rate against other currencies. 
For this reason, the United States has not generally considered the real or probable weakening 
of its currency as a significant problem that needs to be corrected. The absence of restraints on 
the US monetary policy has meant that, in contrast to Keynes’ classic theories on the 
recessionary bias in the international monetary system, the fiduciary dollar standard by which 
the world economy has functioned for the last four decades can produce exactly the opposite 
phenomenon during certain periods: an inflationary bias. The boom which preceded the recent 
crisis could be considered the most noteworthy example of this type of case. 
The third deficiency in the current reserve system is its inequitable nature. As we have already 
highlighted, the need to accumulate international reserves obliges developing countries to 
transfer resources to those countries that issue reserve currencies. This bias towards inequality 
has been magnified in the last few decades by financial and capital market liberalisation, by 
the strongly procyclical behaviour of the capital flowes towards developing countries. This 
behaviour has generated, as we see, a massive accumulation of international reserves as a 
form of insurance against abrupt interruptions in foreign financing. This accumulation can 
also be seen, as we have also shown, as a rational response by each country to a system that 




generates the “composition fallacy” already mentioned, which worsens the distortions in the 
world balance of payments and can generate, as we saw, a recessionary bias. We could call 
this problem the inequality-instability link. 
The three problems mentioned have been clearly present in the behaviour of the world 
economy. The first and the third have already received attention in previous sections of this 
paper. The recessionary biases that could present themselves in the next few years if a 
considerable number of countries try to improve their current account balance (by reducing 
their deficit or increasing their surplus) will generate recessionary biases in the world 
economy, as we stated at the end of the previous section. The massive accumulation of 
reserves by developing countries and their contribution to world economy imbalances is the 
clearest demonstration of the third, as we saw in the second part of this paper. 
Under the fiduciary dollar standard by which the world has lived, deficits in the United States’ 
balance of payments have been the rule rather than the exception. During the past three and a 
half decades, the world has seen itself devastated by an ever more intense cycle of growth and 
contraction in the US current account deficit, which is linked to strong fluctuations in the real 
exchange rate of the main reserve currency, as we can observe in Graphic 6. That implies that 
the dollar has increased lacked the main characteristic that a currency should have to be at the 
centre of the system: a stable value. Moreover, corrections to the US current account have 
also taken place in a context of world economic downturn, as the recent crisis confirmed yet 
again. 
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The interaction between the three problems mentioned is particularly clear in the behaviour of 
the US deficit from the end of the 1990s. As graph 6 indicates, at the end of that decade the 
phase of the greatest deterioration in the US current account in its history began. Although it 
had its equivalent in the deterioration of the internal deficits of the United States, particularly 
among households, it should be recognised that the huge size of the current account 
imbalances are also a result of external factors to the US economy. Among those is the 
combination of the appreciation of dollar and the abrupt divergence between US and world 
growth generated by a recession in a large part of the developing world from 1997. The 
United States deficit served, therefore, to mitigate the antikeynesian bias generated by the 
massive crises experienced back then by the developing countries. 
On the other hand, although the strong US and global deceleration of 2001 allowed the US 
deficit to be reduced, the effect was moderated in relation to similar downturns in the past, 
and the upward trend in the deficit began again the following year. Although that increase is 
linked again to internal problems in the US economy, it is also related to developing 
countries’ strong demand to protect themselves, which was reflected in current account 
surpluses and reserve accumulation, especially by developing economies in eastern Asia and 
the oil exporters. This is why the strong but orderly accumulated depreciation of the dollar 
since 2003 was not accompanied, as was the case in the second half of the eighties, by a 
significant correction in the United States’ current account deficits, which only started in 2008 
as a product of the deep US recession – and a world crisis. 
 
3. REFORMING THE SYSTEM 
Among the alternatives for reforming the international monetary system, the first would be to 
transform the current system into one based on multiple reserve currencies that compete 
between each other. That alternative is, in fact, already implicit in the system that has 
operated since the early seventies and would therefore be in some senses a convenient 
solution. However, it is not clear that the system would necessarily evolve in that direction, as 
the problems that the euro has faced during some phases of the current crisis, especially at the 
end of 2008 and early 2010 when the currency experienced strong downward pressures as 
market agents distrusted the solidity of some members of the monetary union. 
Additionally, and more importantly for the subjects of this paper, a system of this type would 
not correct the main problems of the current monetary standard. It would do nothing to correct 
the antikeynesian bias and each currency would be an unstable value and so would lack what 
we earlier highlighted as one of the essential characteristics for a reserve currency: its 
stability. Although this model would offer developing countries the advantage of being able to 
diversify the composition of their reserves, they would be invested in all forms of 
industrialised country assets, which would maintain the generation of a transfer of resources 
from developing countries to the industrialised nations. One exception would be for the 
renminbi to become the reserve currency but that possibility seems a long way away and 
would only benefit one developing country transformed into a world power. 
Curiously, flexibility in exchange rates between the main reserve currencies constitutes both 




competitive system of reserve currencies to resist attacks on fixed parities that ended up 
bringing down both the silver-gold standard in the 20th century and the gold-dollar standard 
in the early 1960s. However, that flexibility adds an additional element of instability to a 
system purely based on the dollar, due to the volatility in the exchange rate between the main 
reserve currencies – a problem that is, in some ways, already present in the current system. 
Such volatility generates significant profits and losses for the central banks in dealing with 
their reserves and it eliminates one of the characteristics that reserve assets should have: to be 
“safe” or low risk. That is its principle disadvantage. 
This disadvantage would be exacerbated if central banks responded to fluctuations in 
exchange rates by changing the composition of their international reserves, thereby feeding 
exchange rate instability. Under those conditions, a system of multiple reserve currencies 
could generate growing demand for the adoption of an agreement for fixed exchange rates – 
in other words, a return to the Bretton Woods scheme, at least for reserve currencies. 
However, setting exchange rates between the main currencies in a world characterised by high 
capital mobility would be a difficult, or even impossible, task. We should add that, given the 
high demand for international reserves, developing countries suffer from exchange rate 
instability in reserve currencies disproportionately. 
All that implies that the main deficiencies can only be resolved by a deeper reform of the 
world reserve system. Although other alternatives could be designed – such as the Keynes’ 
proposal to create a mechanism for international compensation and other similar solutions4– 
the most viable consists in completing the transition started in the sixties with the creation of 
the Special Drawing Rights (SDRs). That involves placing a world currency with a fiduciary 
character at the centre of the system, completing the evolution of national and international 
monetary systems started in the 19th century (Triffin, 1968). Given the procyclical nature of 
the capital movements that developing countries face, as well as the high demand for 
international reserves that such behaviour generates, the adoption of a scheme of this type 
should be accompanied with other initiatives aimed at guaranteeing the placing of the SDRs 
be used to correct, at least partially, the problems that developing countries face under the 
current system. 
Obviously, the role of the SDRs has changed since the early 1970s with the transformation of 
the international monetary system towards a fiduciary dollar standard. The questions related 
to adequate international liquidity, which were the fundamental concern during the first 
periods after the war, and which were still the centre of debate in the seventies, are no longer 
important except during extraordinary situations like those caused by the severe liquidity 
crunch that was the fallout of the world financial collapse in September and October 2008. As 
we have seen, the fiduciary dollar standard can show an inflationary bias, which reinforces the 
peaks and troughs of the world economy, as happened in 2003-2007. Nevertheless, other 
problems that were also the object of attention in the sixties, continue to be fundamental or 
even more important today, especially those linked to the composition of world reserves, the 
access of developing countries to liquidity and questions of equity related to both processes. 
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reserve system based on commodities, which presented particularly interesting anticyclical characteristics (Hart, Kaldor y 




After the initial allocations carried out in 1970-1972 and 1979-81, no more allocations were 
made for almost three decades. The last of those, approved by the IMF in 1997, for 21.4 
billion SDR, only came into effect in mid-2009 with the approval by the United States of the 
change in the IMF’s Founding Agreement to which it was party. The current crisis, however, 
generated renewed interest in this mechanism for international cooperation, as reflected in the 
G-20 proposal, subsequently approved by the IMF, to allocate the equivalent of 250 billion 
additional dollars, of which little short of 40% benefited developing countries under the 
current system of quotas. That meant the SDR in 2009 reached the equivalent of 283 billion 
dollars. Although that is an important sum and meant that the SDR represented 5% of world 
reserves, that proportion remains inferior even to when the first allocations were made in 
1970-1972, when they reached 10% (Williamson, 2009). The suspension of the SDR for more 
than a quarter of a century had negative effects for developing countries because it coincided 
with an increase in demand in the international reserves of those countries. 
 
We should highlight that any attempted international monetary reform should involve a 
considerable increase in the size of the IMF, which has been significantly lagging behind the 
size of the world economy since the revision in its quotas of 1998 and since the sixties in 
comparison to the magnitude of the capital flows at a world level (IMF, 2009b). Obviously, 
the form in which the Fund obtains its resources is essential. The SDR allocations and the 
quota increases are much better mechanisms than “loan agreements” in their different forms – 
the main option chosen by the G-20 in April 2009, as well as in the past, to grow the 
resources available for the Fund during times of crisis.5  
The creation of a system based to a greater degree on the SDR would contribute to a large 
extent to resolve both the Triffin dilemma as well as the distributive effects caused by the use 
of the US currency as the principle reserve asset. In the last few years, the proposals to 
increase the SDR issues have followed two different models. The first consists in carrying out 
SDR issues in an anticyclical way, concentrating them basically in periods of crisis and 
possibly destroying them once financial conditions normalise (United Nations, 1999; 
Camdessus, 2000; Ocampo, 2002). That would create an anticyclical element in the handling 
of international liquidity. The second model proposes regular SDR allocations equivalent to 
the additional reserve demand at a world level, so at least 100-150 billion dollars a year, even 
if we apply the exceptional recent period in reserve accumulation, although it should reach at 
least double that sum. That is also the size of the SDRs that should be issued in the long-term 
for anticyclical purposes. One alternative that combines these two options would be to make 
regular issues, but to keep them inactive and make them effective only under pre-established 
conditions. 
One fundamental problem this reform faces are the current IMF quotas that are also the  basis 
for issuing the SDR and do not reflect the realities of today’s world economy. Apart from the 
subjects that have been the object of discussion in recent debates on the Fund quotas, which 
have led to marginal improvements, the most important issue is the enormous gap between 
the demand for reserves from developing economies and industrialised ones, which is at the 
heart of the inequalities in the world reserve system and the inequality-instability link spelt 
                                                 




out above. The problem can only be corrected through a reform or a combination of four types 
of reforms (since they are not mutually exclusive). 
The first would be to include international reserve demand as a criterion for the SDR 
allocations, which would mean in practice awarding a large part of the issues to developing 
countries. 
The second consists in linking anticylical SDR issues to the IMF financing during crises in 
order to thereby improve the provision of a “collective insurance” against balance of payment 
crises. One option to do that would be to consider those SDR that are not used by countries to 
be deposits (or loans) to the IMF, which could be employed by the institution as loans to 
countries requesting resources.6 Of course, for this task it is essential to improve the Fund’s 
credit lines and their conditionality in order to overcome the stigma associated with loans 
from this institution. Another option that could be considered is to adopt at least part of 
Keynes’ original plan: to create a drawing line that can be unconditionally used by all IMF 
members for a pre-established sum and period. Another possibility, which might be more 
politically feasible, would be for the IMF to grant unconditional credit to countries suffering 
shocks that have clearly foreign origins, whether the shocks affect a country’s capital account 
or its current account. The compensatory credit line, which was scrapped in March 2009, 
worked when it used light conditionality rules. 
The third proposal would be to create an explicit “development link” in the SDR allocations 
(which could be an alternative or a complementary proposal to the first one). One of the 
proposals along these lines is to use the SDR allocation corresponding to industrialised 
countries to finance official development aid and the provision of global public goods 
(Stiglitz, 2006: Chap. 9). This suggestion has many advantages, but poses the problem of such 
transferrals being fiscal, and therefore they might need approval by each respective national 
parliament. An alternative to this would be a similar scheme to the one suggested by the 
Group of Experts gathered by UNCTAD in the sixties (UNCTAD, 1965): allow the IMF to 
buy bonds from multilateral development banks to then finance the long-term resource 
demands of developing countries. 
The fourth proposal would be to encourage the creation of funds or other regional reserve 
agreements in developing countries – such as the Latin American Reserve Fund the the 
Chiang Mai Agreement mentioned earlier – that would provide a complementary form of 
collective insurance. One very important incentive to such regional agreements would be a 
provision under which the SDR were proportional not just to the IMF quotas but also to the 
reserves the developing countries would have brought to regional reserve funds (United 
Nations, 1999, Ocampo, 2002). 
Lastly, there are two complementary reforms that many analysts consider necessary to 
consolidate the role of the SDR in the international monetary system. The first is to allow the 
use of the currency in some transactions in the private sector (see, among others, Kenen, 
1983). Of course, there are different intermediate methods: to allow the use of the SDRs only 
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for specific purposes, like setting no regulatory obligations on capital requirements or 
liquidity in financial institutions. 
The second would be creating a “substitution account”, a suggestion made at the end of the 
sixties when the dollar faced negative pressures. That account would allow countries to 
exchange their dollar assets for SDR assets issued by the IMF without putting pressure on the 
dollar in the market. A system like this would give more stability to the current monetary 
standard and would be, in any case, a necessary transition mechanism for a world reserve 
system based on SDRs. The IMF decision of July 2009 to allow the issuing of securities 
denominated in SDR to draw in resources from some emerging economies (Brazil, China and 
Russia) can be considered a step in that direction. The fundamental problem, underlined in the 
debates of the sixties, is how to distribute the losses that the IMF could incur with a 
mechanism of this type. That said, those costs are not necessarily very high. Retrospective 
calculations done by Kenen (2009), as if the mechanism had been in place in the period 1995-
2008, indicated that losses would have been minimal. 
The current context could be a good moment to introduce these reforms. Firstly, the 
inflationary risks associated with SDR issues are low and, on the plus side, such issues could 
reduce the recessionary bias that the world economy is facing because of the fear of running 
up deficits that arise from  the trends in world trade imbalances. Secondly, the United States 
has embarked on a huge fiscal deficit and an aggressive monetary strategy. That has potential 
implications for the stability of the current reserve system, as some countries have pointed 
out, China especially (Zhou, 2009). In reality, under the current circumstances, the northern 
American country could find its central role in the global monetary system rather 
uncomfortable since it could be an obstacle to its freedom in economic policy. 
In any case, abandoning the dollar as the chief world reserve currency is consistent with it 
maintaining its role as the principle international payment method, unless SDRs become used 
in larger financial transactions. The use of the dollar as a payment method increases demand 
for the US financial system and has other implications for the country that have been explored 
by other authors (see Cooper, 1987: Chap. 7 for instance). It clearly remains to be seen 
whether the crisis under way will have permanent effects on the role of the United States as 
the world’s main banker. 
 
4. By way of conclusion: an overall look at 
reform of international financial architecture. 
 
The Asian crisis of 1997 and its move to Russia and Latin America led to great interest in 
reforming international financial architecture. A decade later and in the face of what was the 
prelude to a new financial crisis, which had its epicentre in the main world economy, progress 
on reform has been clearly disappointing. In fact, world economic imbalances were probably 
more pronounced than at any time since the Second World War, the regulatory deficit in the 
most developed financial markets was massive and the IMF found itself undergoing its worst 
crisis in its history. 
One positive aspect about the period 1997-2007 was the definition of a broad consensus on 
international financial and development reform, the Monterrey Consensus, adopted in 2002. 
The following conference on the Monterrey agenda, carried out in Doha (Qatar) at the end of 
November 2008, and the Summit on the global financial and economic crisis and its impact 
on development that the United Nations called in June 2009, were important opportunities to 
look again, in the United Nations, at problems of international financial cooperation. The 
Doha conference was preceded not just by the eruption of the global financial crisis but also 
by the creation of the G-20 at the level of leaders, which began by adopted aid initiatives in 
various fields. 
The main progress throughout the decade of 1997-2007 was centred on strengthening 
macroeconomic schemes and the financial regulation of developing countries and in creating 
or deepening local bond markets in those countries. In turn, those countries responded to the 
absence of a good collective world insurance mechanism against financial and balance of 
payment crises with their own massive insurance, through an unprecedented accumulation of 
international reserves. Add to that, in eastern Asia, the Chiang Mai Initiative, which created a 
regional mechanism to support countries during crisis. At an international level, some IMF 
credit lines were improved and a failed debate took place on the introduction of a multilateral 
mechanism to solve sovereign debt crises. 
The efforts that the developing countries themselves made are, therefore, the main 
developments in international financial reform in the period 1997-2007. The main paradox of 
that was that international reform was based more on the national reforms carried by 
developing countries than on a true reform of the international financial architecture. Those 
efforts served during the global crisis of 2007-8 to help to somewhat cushion developing 
countries from its impact. 
As a result of the global financial crisis that hit in September 2008, there have been important 
advances. Among them is the renewed issuing of SDRs and the creation of new IMF 
facilities, as well as the widening of existing ones to poor countries, and the proposals under 
discussion for the introduction of an international tax on large currency transactions. There 
have also been huge debates and commitments to make important financial regulatory reforms 
in the main industrialised countries. Nevertheless, these last developments have only partially 




One important realisation, which came to fruition after the Asian crisis, was the need for a 
world governance structure where developing countries had adequate “voice and 
representation” in world economic decisions, to use the terminology of the Monterrey 
Consensus. This representation in the period 1997-2006 was in some cases inadequate (the 
IMF and the World Bank) and in other cases partial (the International Settlements Bank) or 
non-existent (the Basel Committee and the Financial Stability Forum). Greater representation 
would achieve part of a larger process for the structure to reflect that of today’s world 
economy and not that of the years after the Second World War when the Bretton Woods 
organisations were created. An additional element is the veto that the United States has had on 
the main IMF decisions, beyond an excessive informal influence, that became particularly 
clear during the Asian crisis. 
The IMF made some steps on “voice and representation” for developing countries in 2006, 
although they were relatively timid. The World Bank initiated discussion on the issue 
afterwards and that is still ongoing. It is worthwhile highlighting that in both organisations the 
changes that the world economy has experienced demand a greater weight be given to Asian 
developing economies at the expense mainly of European countries. That could be achieved, 
even in a manner consistent with maintaining or increasing European influence in those 
organisations, if a seat was created to represent the European Union and not individual 
countries. We should also add that the reform proposals have shown the need to also increase 
the voice of the poorest countries in international organisations. However, given the loss of 
participation of those countries in the world economy, the only solution in their case is to 
increase the basic votes of the poor countries in international institutions. That method was 
adopted in the IMF reforms of 2006. 
The most important changes in terms of governance that the international financial crisis 
produced was, as underlined, the creation of the G-20 at the level of world leaders. The G-20 
had previously operated since its creation after the Asian crisis as a forum for tax ministers, 
which had relatively little impact. One of the G-20 decisions was to give access to all its 
members to regulatory organisations on financial matters, especially to those assigned the task 
of coordinating the tasks of world financial reform, the renamed Financial Stability Board 
(previously Forum). These reforms therefore increased the representation of developing 
countries on those organs. Although that represents progress, it also throws up serious 
questions, given the ad hoc way in which the membership of such organisations are defined, 
which implies the exclusion of some large countries (Nigeria is the case that most stands out). 
In this sense, the creation of the G-20 at leadership level should be merely seen as a transition 
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